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REPLY OF APPELLANT TO 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Supreme Court No. 15498 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH: 
Appellant respectfully urges that Respondents' Petition 
for a Rehearing in this case be denied on the following grounds: 
1. Respondents have failed to show a proper ground for 
rehearing in that their petition is not based on any matter 
not already before this Court when it rendered its opinion or 
that was not available to Respondents to present at some 
earlier point in this case. 
2. Respondents have failed to meet their burden of 
showing this Court overlooked a material fact, based its decision 
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on a wrong principle of law, misapplied or overlooked anything 
materially affecting the result reached in its decision, or 
erred in its conclusions of law. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully 
urges that Respondents' Petition for Rehearing be denied. 
DATED this~~-day of September, 1978. 
J. BLAINE ZOLLINGER 
Logan City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
1 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH I 
By 
~S~U-Z_A_NN-=E~M-.~D-AL ___ L_I~M-0-R~E~~~~~~-i 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION 
Appellant here responds to Respondents' Petition for 
Rehearing filed August 2, 1978, urging that this Court rehear 
and reconsider its opinion rendered on the 13th day of July, 
1978. Respondents urge rehearing of those portions of this 
Court's decision that reverse the First Judicial District 
court's Summary Declaratory Judgment, which judgment construed 
and interpreted Utah's Optional Forms of Municipal Government 
Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act" or the "Optional 
Mayor-Council Act"). 
Respondents seek relief in the form of a new opinion 
from this Court that sustains the lower court's Summary Declara-
tory Judgment, in accord with the dissent of Judge Crockett 
filed in this Court's opinion, or, in the alternative, for an 
Order expressly finding the statutes in question ambiguous 
and remanding the case to the lower court for the purpose of 
receiving evidence pertinent to the resolution of the arn-
bigui ties so found. Appellant seeks the denial of Respondents' 
Petition for Rehearing on the grounds alleged above as are 
more fully supported in the Appellant's accompanying Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant agrees that the substantive facts relating 
to this Petition for Rehearing are accurately reflected in the 
record of the case that was before this Court when it rendered 
its opinion on July 13, 1978. 
Appellant objects, however, to Respondents' elaboration 
of "procedural facts", in that that is not a statement of facts 
at all but is rather unsupported argument in favor of Respond-
ents' position on its Petition for Rehearing. 
The procedural facts that are pertinent to this 
Court's determination of Respondents' position are rather 
as follows: 
1. Respondents (Plaintiffs below) filed a Complaint 
in the First Judicial District Court for the State of Utah 
seeking a judicial declaration of the respective rights, 
duties and powers of the municipal council and the mayor of 
Logan City under the Utah's Optional Mayor-Council Act. 
2. Appellant (Defendant below) moved to dismiss that 
action, which motion was denied. There were various procedural 
machinations regarding motions to strike and to dismiss filed 
by both parties. 
3. Respondents moved for summary judgment on nearly 
every count in the claims alleged in their Complaint, and 
stipulated that there were no material issues of fact with 
respect to the construction of the Act to obtain a ruling on 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. Respondents did not seek 
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an evidentiary hearing on the key question of the separation 
of powers under the Act which question necessarily involved 
the issue of who, the mayor or the council, had the power to 
dispose of and make determinations with respect to real 
property. 
4. The lower court issued an interim memorandum 
decision granting partial declaratory summary judgment on 
certain of Respondents' claims, reserving other of the claims 
involving factual matters going to the actual disputes be-
tween the parties for evidentiary hearing. 
5. After the evidentiary hearing on these issues, 
at which time Respondents did introduce evidence going toward 
the basic questions of interpretation of the Act, for example, 
the Ballot Title upon which the citizens of Logan City had 
voted in adopting the Optional Mayor-Council Act, the lower 
court issued a final declaratory summary judgment ruling 
in favor of Plaintiffs' positions on virtually all their 
claims. 
6. Appellants appealed from the lower court decision 
and both parties filed briefs. This Court received amicus 
briefs from two of the Logan Municipal Councilmen and from 
certain legislators, including a sponsor of the optional 
Mayor-Council Act. All briefs argued the law governing 
questions of statutory interpretation, the history and context 
and development of the Optional Mayor-Council Act. 
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7. Neither in their brief nor at oral argument did 
Respondents urge that an express finding of ambiguity was nec-
essary before the legislative intent behind the Act could be 
considered by this Court, or that Respondents had been or would 
be denied due process if legislative intent were considered. 
This was the case even though Respondents filed their brief 
nearly one month after the legislator's amicus brief was filed 
and directly addressed the amicus position on legislative 
intent in their appeal brief. 
8. On July 13, 1978 this Court rendered its opinion 
reversing the lower court in ruling in favor of the position 
urged by Appellant with respect to the proper interpretation 
and application of the Optional Mayor-Council Act. 
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BRIEF 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW 
A PROPER GROUND FOR REHEARING 
IN THAT THEIR PETITION IS NOT 
BASED ON ANY MATTER NOT ALREADY 
BEFORE THIS COURT OR THAT WAS 
NOT AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS AT 
SOME EARLIER POINT IN THIS CASE. 
It is clear that the Utah Supreme Court has never 
favored petitions for rehearing and that a heavy burden is upon 
those seeking a rehearing of a decision from this Court to justify 
it on a proper ground. ~, In Re MacKnight, 4 u. 237, 9 P. 
299 (1886). Petitions for rehearing will be denied when the 
petitioners offer nothing new and important for reconsideration 
~the court. Docheneau v. House, 4 U. 43~, 11 P. 618 (1886); 
Jones v. House, 4 U. 484, 11 P. 619 (1886). Petitions for re-
hearing will not be granted even on the basis of totally new 
issues and arguments if those points and arguments were avail-
, able to the petitioners to have presented to the court at any 
prior stage of the proceeding. Such new matters will not even 
be considered by the court on a petition for rehearing. ~' 
In Re Lowe's Estate, 68 U. 49, 249 P. 128 (1926); Western Securi-
ties Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mine Co., 57 U. 88, 192 P. 664 
(1920); Dahlquist v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 52 U. 438, 
174 P. 833 (1918). 
Respondents base their petition for rehearing on 
several arguments, all of which were either pointed out to 
the lower court as shown by the record on appeal, or in 
Respondents' appeal brief, or in oral argument before this 
Court. 
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Respondents make much of the argument that unless 
and until there is an express finding that a statute is ambiguous, 
no matters beyond the express language of the enactment, par-
ticularly legislative intent, may be considered, However, 
the very basis for this action was that Logan City officials 
were not clear from the terms of the Optional Mayor-Council Act 
as to the scope of their respective powers and duties. Appellant 
argued in its appeal brief that the lower court had misconstrued 
the Act. Appellant argued that the Act's language must be viewed 
in light of other Utah statutes and of the intent of the legis-
lature in enacting the overall statutory s9heme. 
Respondents' brief urged that the express language 
of the Act, particularly of the 1975 version where it referenced 
"governing body" decided the issue, as was the basis for the 
lower court's judgment. Respondents' brief did not urge that 
the question of interpretation or application of the Act was 
improperly before this Court on appeal in that no express find-
ing of ambiguity had been made as it now urges in its petition 
for rehearing. Indeed, Respondents' brief explicitly traced 
the history of the Act from the 1975 version through the 1977 
amendments, and expressly referred to legislative intent in 
several places. (See e.g., Brief of Respondents 
at pp. 22, 23, 28). 
Moreover, Respondents addressed the amicus brief 
filed by the legislative general counsel which brief dealt with 
the propriety of considering legislative intent, and with the 
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actual intent behind the Act. Again, Respondents did not urge 
that the issue could not be considered absent an express finding 
that the Act is ambiguous. 
Consequently, all of the arguments that Respondents 
make with respect to the necessity of finding an ambiguity 
in the statute were available to it at the briefing stage of 
this appeal. Having not raised the issue then, Respondents 
may not now urge the point as a ground upon which rehearing 
can be granted. 
Respondents make the somewhat incredible argument 
that they have been denied procedural due process by virtue 
of this Court's rendering an opinion based upon the record 
before it. Respondents' argument is that this Court's receipt 
of the legislators' amicus brief constituted the receipt of 
evidence of legislative intent that was not presented to the 
trial court below and upon which this Court impermissibly 
relied. This, Respondents urge, denied them the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present their 
i own "evidence" of legislative intent. 
As will be seen in Point II of this brief, this 
Court properly received and properly used the amicus brief 
filed by the Utah State legislators. Moreover, the amicus 
brief contained nothing that could even remotely be characterized 
as evidentiary. It contained arguments only of the proper laws 
of statutory interpretation, the history of the Act, and the 
context in which it was enacted. These are matters which this 
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Court has repeatedly held are proper matters of consideration. 
~'Parker v. Rampton, 27 U.2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972). 
But more importantly, the argument that due process 
was denied was available to Respondents at the initial briefing 
stages of this appeal. Appellant believes that Respondents 
did not there raise it because they could not, having waived 
the point by themselves filing for declaratory relief, having 
moved for summary judgment and having stipulated that there was 
no material issue of fact with respect to proper application and 
interpretation of the Optional Mayor-Council Act. 
It is ridiculous for Respondent~ to claim they have 
been denied their day in Court. They are held to have known 
that this Court places a heavy premium on ascertaining legis-
lative intent whenever the meaning of a statute is called into 
question. ~' Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 U.2d 337, 
411 P.2d 831 (1966). Clearly intent became important the 
instant Respondents filed their Complaint. 
If Respondents had thought it material to introduce 
below individual legislator's testimony, journals, records 
or any other facts pertinent to intent, they could have done 
so. They did not. They may not, therefore, now urge their 
failure to introduce evidence as a ground for a rehearing. 
Respondents argue that this Court has essentially 
decided this appeal arbitrarily. Again, the issue of the 
arbitrariness of this Court's opinion turns on the validity 
Respondents' previously available argument that an express 
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finding of ambiguity was necessary, and secondly, upon the 
validity the Respondents' argument that it therefore follows 
' that they were denied due process. As none of Respondents' 
premises constitute new matters not available to them at least 
at the initial briefing stages of this appeal, it follows that 
their conclusion of arbitrariness is similarly vulnerable. 
Respondents raise many points of law that they claim 
this Court decided erroneously, including the legislature's 
power over real property and the proper rules of statutory 
construction to be applied to this case. All of these points 
1 were argued exhaustively by Respondents before the court below, 
' and before this Court. This Court had the benefit of all ar-
gwnents and authorities and ruled accordingly. None of these 
matters, therefore, is new, and, as will be seen under Point 
II, Respondents have not met their burden of convincing this 
Court that it ruled improperly on any of them. Again, these 
arguments provide no justification for a rehearing. Respondents' 
argument on rehearing is essentially and fundamentally that 
' they are disappointed with the majority decision in this Court. 
' This Court didn't rule in favor of the Respondents, and they 
simply do not like it. They wish the majority had accepted 
Justice Crockett's view, who ruled to Respondents' liking 
apparently on the same record as the rest of the Court. 
This Court has held that it is not a proper ground 
for rehearing that counsel is dissatisfied with the result as 
hr 
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reflected in the final opinion. This Court will not rehear a 
case simply to drop points or to adopt other conclusions based 
upon what might or might not be satisfactory to counsel seeking 
the rehearing. Beaver County v. Home Indemnity, 88 u. 1, 52 
P.2d 435 (1935). 
Appellant respectfully urges that Respondents' argu-
ments for rehearing do not raise one new material point not 
available to Respondents before. Therefore, totally aside from 
any consideration of the meritoriousness or the legal accuracy 
of Respondents' arguments, they have simply not alleged any 
proper ground upon which this Court can gr~nt a rehearing. 
For this reason alone, Appellant respectfully urges that Re-
spondents' petition for rehearing be denied. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET 
THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING THIS COURT 
HAS OVERLOOKED A MATERIAL FACT, BASED 
ITS DECISION ON A WRONG PRINCIPLE OF 
LAW, MISAPPLIED ANYTHING MATERIALLY 
AFFECTING THE RESULT REACHED IN ITS 
DECISION OR ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. 
As was noted above, the burden is heavy upon the 
petitioners seeking a rehearing to convince the court of the 
following: (1) that it failed to consider some material 
point; (2) that it erred in its cinclusions of law; (3) that 
petitioner has discovered some new matter, some new position 
and point of law overlooked before that was unknown at the 
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origination of the appeal and which properly ought to be con-
sidered by the court in connection with the opinion rendered. 
In Re MacKnight, 4 U. 237, 9 P. 299 (1886). 
Appellant has shown that Respondents' arguments contain 
nothing not available to them before. Consequently, they must 
convince this Court that it erred, overlooked or misapplied 
proper rules of law. This too they have failed to do. 
Respondents rely heavily upon the legal argument 
that as a matter of statutory construction there must be an 
1 
express finding that a statute is ambiguous before any extraneous 
1 matters, including any questions of legislative intent can be 
' looked to by the court in construing the statute. Respondents 
urge that this follows from an established rule of statutory 
construction characterized as the "plain and unambiguous rule." 
The plain and unambiguous rule is almost universally 
accepted, and provides that where the meaning of a statute is 
unequivocally clear, the court will not look beyond it to create 
an ambiguity. However, Respondents have misconstrued the applica-
tion of the rule. It does not follow from the rule that all 
statutes are presumed plain and unambiguous unless and until 
some party points out and claims upon an alleged ambiguity and 
the court thereafter expressly finds such an ambiguity to exist. 
It does not follow that any statute capable of an interpretation 
is therefore plain and unambiguous. Rather, the rule provides 
that there are certain terms and phrases that all reasonable men 
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would understand as having the same meaning, and which could 
only mean one thing in the context of the statute in which 
they are found. In such a case, it is obvious that the courts 
will not allow a party, who disagrees with the plain and un-
ambiguous meaning of a statute and wishes it to have a different 
meaning, to introduce evidence creating an ambiguity. That is 
not the same as requiring that a party expressly point out to 
the court what the ambiguity is and that the court so affir-
matively find before any evidence pertinent to the interpretation 
of the phrase or statute is receivable. No Utah Supreme Court 
case has ever held that a court must affirmatively or expressly 
on the record find the existence of an ambiguity before it can 
look to matters beyond the actual statutory words as an aid to 
interpretation. 
Respondents' argument that there was no ambiguity 
in the Optional Mayor-Council Act is patently absurd. There 
was a sufficient ambiguity in the statute to give rise to Re-
spondents' filing a complaint containing nine separate counts 
alleging actual disputes between members of the Logan City 
Municipal Council and the Mayor of Logan City in interpreting 
their respective powers under the Optional Mayor-Council Act. 
Respondents raised the issue of the ambiguity and in fact 
claimed under it by filing their Complaint for declaratory relief. 
The trial court expressly found that the questions raised by 
Respondents' Complaint were properly subject to declaratory 
relief in that not only was there a statutory interpretation in-
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valved (necessarily implying an ambiguity), but that actual 
, ~y-to-day real disputes existed between the council and mayor 
as to what powers and duties the act imposed upon them to warrent 
a,~claratory relief. (See Final Declaratory Sununary Judgment 
at pp. 4-6). No error on the part of this Court in looking to 
proper matters of legislative intent is therefore made out. 
Given that Respondents' argument as to the necessity 
of an express finding of ambiguity and the failure of the lower 
court to so find is incorrect, every argument that follows from 
that incorrect premise is also fallacious. Respondents' next 
argument is that this Court improperly looked at and considered 
a brief in the form of an arnicus curiae filed on behalf of cer-
tain state legislators going into questions of legislative 
intent. The Utah court has held repeatedly that where a statute 
is unclear (as it obviously was in this case) the court would 
properly look to the reasons for and the history of the enact-
ment to determine legislative intent. Parker v. Rampton, 28 
U.2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972). 
Indeed, Respondents themselves pointed out the 
history of the Act as being material to its construction in 
their brief on appeal at p. 10. This Court, therefore, properly 
allowed the amicus brief to be filed, the brief was filed in a 
proper form serving the classic function of an arnicus to aid · 
the Court in understanding certain areas with respect to intent 
that were necessary to the Court's interpretation of the statute 
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contained nothing evidentiary and was properly relied on by 
the court as background for its decision. 
From Respondents' fallacious premise that an express 
finding of ambiguity is somehow a condition precedent to the 
consideration of any legislative intent, they move to their 
next fallacious premise that legislative intent was improperly 
expressed in the amicus brief, and from that, to their falla-
cious conclusion that Respondents were denied due process be-
cause improper evidence worked its way into this Court's opinion. 
To state Respondents' argument is to disprove it. As the question 
of the application and interpretation of the Optional Mayor-Council 
Act was at issue, the statute obviously was unclear. As the 
statute was unclear, it was proper for this Court to consider 
all correct elements of legislative intent. Correct elements of 
legislative intent were properly expressed and in proper form 
in the amicus brief filed by the legislators. The Court's 
opinion which touched upon the amicus brief as background and 
history only, was a proper use of the matters contained in the 
amicus brief. It, therefore, follows that at every step of 
this appeal, the proceedings have been completely proper and 
have done no harm to Respondents except that the decision was 
not the one that they sought. 
Respondents' due process argument, of course, also 
alleges that they were denied the opportunity to present wit-
nesses as to legislative intent. It is abundantly clear, as 
has been argued before this Court in the past, that individual 
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opinions of single legislators are not proper considerations 
going to legislative intent. ~, Castenada-Gonzalez v. Irrunigration 
, and Naturalization Service, 564 F.2d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977); See also, 
Jensen v. Matheson, Supreme Court Case No. 15826, July 27, 1978. 
It follows, therefore, that Respondents cannot claim 
a denial of due process on the basis of their inability to 
introduce witnesses whose testimony would never have been 
, material to any stage of the proceeding. Indeed, Respondents 
did in fact introduce evidence at the trial court level going 
1 to the legislative intent behind the statute in the form of 
the Ballot Title upon which the citizens of Logan City voted. 
In short, Respondents' arguments based on ambiguity, 
improper evidence and arbitrary decision by this Court and the 
denial of due process are all completely unsound. Therefore, 
Respondents have not met their burden of showing that on any 
of these bases the Court acted erroneously. 
Respondents further argue that as a matter of law, 
the Court improperly applied the federal and state models with 
respect to the proper separation of power even if it correctly 
characterized the Logan City form of government as a true 
separate powers form of government. Respondents focus on the 
question of the power to buy and sell real property as dis-
tinguished from the power to make general policy with respect 
to its ultimate disposition. Respondents' argument basically 
is that the respective Constitution of the United States and 
of the State of Utah give their respective legislative bodies 
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"plenary" power over the disposition of public lands. 
As was argued in Appellant's brief at the outset of 
this appeal, however, the question is not what the Utah state 
legislature or the Congress of the United States has power to 
do but what the municipal council of Logan has power to do. 
Appellant argued that the grant of power in this case was state 
statute which provided the fundamental legal basis, sort of a 
quasi constitution, for Logan City government. 
Upon proper application and interpretation of the 
statutes granting power to the municipalities in the State of 
Utah, this Court ruled that the mayor has power over the dis-
position of real property as an executive power under the 
statutory scheme of a separate-powers form of government in Logan 
City. The Court had before it all the arguments of law per-
tinent to the point as presented by Appellant and Respondents. 
What Respondents are doing is re-arguing their posi-
tion with respect to the power over real property. Again, 
Appellant urges that Respondents' only real grievance with the 
opinion issued from this Court is that it did not favor Re-
spondents. Consequently, Appellant believes that Respondents 
have not urged any meritorious basis for a rehearing on the 
real property question. 
Finally, Respondents urge that the opinion of Justice 
Hall has misapplied or ignored all of the fundamental rules of 
statutory interpretation. Interestingly, throughout their briefs 
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Respondents do not cite specific Utah cases that deal with 
what specific canons of statutory construction this Court is 
obligated to apply. Rather, Respondents rely heavily on general 
treatises that address principles adopted throughout the country 
in varying degrees in varying courts. The appropriate rules 
of statutory construction were argued by Appellant in its ini-
tial brief, and were pointed out again by amicus in their brief 
on behalf of the state legislators. The Utah law on this sub-
ject provides that legislative intent must be looked to and 
specifically states to what sources of legislative intent this 
Court might look. ~, Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 U.2d 
337, 411 P. 2d 831 (1966). 
The ambiguity in the statute at issue here does not 
depend on any hypertechnical narrow rule of construction such 
as those urged by Respondents. What is at issue here, placed 
in issue by Respondents' filing their claim for declaratory 
relief, is the overall, general application of an entire 
statutory scheme both specifically as its language applies 
and generally as modified and in the context of the overall 
grants of power to municipal governments. 
This Court found that the lower court had improperly 
construed this statutory scheme by focusing too narrowly on 
specific words such as "governing body" without viewing the 
entire statutory framework. This Court then proceeded to view 
the entire statutory framework to put all phrases and all alloca-
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tions of power in the proper context. That was what this Court 
was obligated to do by the issues raised in the context of the 
proceedings below and on this appeal. 
This Court applied not only the proper rules of 
statutory construction but the only rules of statutory con-
struction material to the issues before it. Again, Appellant 
urges that Respondents are objecting not to the method by which 
this Court reached its conclusion, but the conclusion reached 
in that it was not favorable to Respondents. Indeed, Re-
spondents urge that this Court adopted the opinion of Justice 
Crockett. Appellant frankly cannot see where Justice Crockett 
specifically and methodically applied those canons of 
construction urged by Respondents as proper. Indeed, it appears 
that Justice Crockett applied the very same method that the rest 
of this Court applied, that of viewing the statutory scheme as 
a whole in context and came to a differing conclusion. It is 
the conclusion with which Respondents agree, they have no ob-
jection with his method so that it appears that they should 
have no objection to the majority's method of arriving at its 
conclusion. 
From the foregoing, it appears that Respondents have 
not met their burden of convincing this Court that it erroneously 
applied any rule of law. Nor have they shown to the satisfaction 
of anyone that this Court failed to consider any material point. 
Nor have they shown that some newly discovered point of law is 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 21 -
pertinent and overriding. All Respondents have done is urge 
that this Court erred by not agreeing with their position. 
This court has never held that to be a proper ground for 
rehearing, and certainly it is not so in the instant case. 
For the above reasons, therefore, Appellant respectfully urges 
that Respondents' petition for rehearing be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~~~day of September, 1978. 
J. BLAINE ZOLLINGER 
Logan City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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